1. Choose
Services, support, taxes, housing and migration. Every measure has beneficiaries and trade-offs.
One country. Limited resources.
Services, immigration and safety. Choose the rules and face their consequences.
Make 16 decisions for Spain. See who gains, what is postponed and which commitments continue into future years.
Build my budgetNo account · saved on your device · approximate figures
A rounded educational baseline, not spare money. Higher spending and lower taxes need funding. €1bn = €1,000 million.
Services, support, taxes, housing and migration. Every measure has beneficiaries and trade-offs.
Cover costs with revenue or concrete changes. If you choose debt, see its accumulation and interest.
Test other assumptions and compare policy tools with documented party positions. No predetermined winning ideology.
An approximate educational model covering all levels of government. It is not an official budget or a forecast of a manifesto. Some choices require reforms and coordination across government powers.
Rounded 2027 baseline: GDP €1,880bn, revenue €810bn, spending €850bn including €45bn interest, and opening debt €1,760bn. There is already a €40bn deficit. Option amounts are illustrative allocations or tax targets, not estimates of specific laws.
The scale draws on INE, IGAE and Banco de España, with rounded and simplified flows. Spring revenue ratios and revised autumn GDP are not combined into a claimed official execution. For 2028–2030, GDP and nominal flows grow at an assumed 4%: a game continuation, not a Banco de España forecast.
The baseline stays fixed when comparing your package. Scenarios change costs, savings, revenue and incremental debt rates; they are sensitivity checks, not probabilities or full macroeconomic scenarios. New interest starts the following year at the scenario rate; existing debt is not repriced. This simplified baseline omits stock-flow adjustments.
No growth, crime, housing or living-standard figure is calculated from ideology, religion or origin. Possible effects are explained through mechanisms, sources and limits. Hiring, integration and tax cuts are not assumed to pay for themselves.
The €80bn extra-debt cap is a game rule, not a legal or bankruptcy threshold. “No extra deficit” means not worsening the baseline deficit; it does not mean the state has no debt.
All government levels, €725.001bn. These are not executed 2027 amounts. Interest is already included in general services.
Version: es-2026-10-social-v2 · Review: 2026-10-30. Shared runs retain their original supported version. If a version is retired, users are asked to start again; decisions are not silently reinterpreted.
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Social evidence: Spain, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands
Observed differences are shown, including gaps remaining after adjustments. They are not causal coefficients for Spain. Nationality, birthplace, parents, religion, suspicion, conviction and victimisation are distinct. Reviewed: 2026-10-30.
Denmark · convictions and family origin
In 2024, age-adjusted male indices are 137 for non-Western immigrants and 245 for descendants; all men = 100. Adjustment for family education lowers the latter to 203 without eliminating the gap. Public support among immigrant men aged 30–59: full-time equivalents of 45% for Somalia, 49% for Lebanon and 44% for Iraq (table 5.5).
Men aged 15–79 found guilty, including traffic and special laws. This is not a rape or religion index. Descendant status uses parental birthplace and citizenship, not indefinite grandparent tracing. An index of 316 does not mean 316% of people offend. Benefit figures combine types and duration; they do not measure willingness or establish that someone never works.
Lebanon includes descendants of stateless Palestinians. Individuals’ religion is not established here.
Ch. 1 definitions; tables 5.5, 6.6–6.10, printed pp. 104–118
Netherlands · suspects and parents
CBS 2023 registered suspects, ages 12+: 0.6% with two Netherlands-born parents, 1.2% with one foreign-born parent, 2.8% with two, and 1.1% among foreign-born residents. The two-foreign-parent group fell from 6.8% in 2005 to 2.8%.
Suspicion is not conviction. These provisional percentages are not age/sex adjusted. Victimisation is also measured. Most people in every group were not registered as suspects.
Tables 5.1.1a–d; suspects, population aged 12+
Ch. 3, work, benefits and safety; original-cohort denominator includes departures/deaths
Finland · work, benefits and origin definitions
Historical 1990–2013 research documents lower employment and higher benefits among Afghanistan-, Iraq- and Somalia-born residents. After ten years, average male earnings were 22–38% of same-age native men’s earnings. This does not establish individual unwillingness to work.
Historical evidence, not a 2026 fiscal balance. StatFin 13z4 uses both parents’ or the only known parent’s birthplace, usually the mother’s country for background. People, episodes, cleared offences and suspicions differ. The 2025 age-band extract below uses the principal-offence method, available only for people with a Finnish identity code. Ages within each band are not standardised.
API verified 2026-10-30; updated 2026-05-27. These are not nationality groups: naturalised citizens may retain foreign-background classification.
pp. 91–114; historical country-of-birth employment/earnings/benefits cohorts
2025 males, age bands, penal-code offences; principal-offence persons and rates per 10,000; API snapshot and query retained.
Research review: admission reason, education and integration; not a Spanish forecast
Fiscal contribution · different accounts
Dutch IZA 17569 modelling finds positive lifetime contributions for labour migrants and negative ones for other admission motives. Table 3 estimates +€42,000 for Western and −€167,000 for non-Western first-generation migrants: discounted lifetime values, not annual costs. Finland’s 2026 review also distinguishes motive and skills. Denmark’s ministry publishes annual accounts by origin and permit.
IZA is a working paper using 2016 microdata, not an official CBS forecast. Discounting, shared-service allocation, age, return migration and descendants affect results; initial Renaissance Instituut funding is disclosed. NIDI offers an alternative synthesis. Per-person amounts cannot be transplanted to Spain.
Sections 3, 7–8; tables 3–4; discounting, migration motives, public-cost allocation and sensitivity
Alternative research synthesis and fiscal-accounting caveats
Annual net fiscal accounting; residence grounds and duration, pp. 12–15
Research review: admission reason, education and integration; not a Spanish forecast
Spain · what INE measures
In 2025, adult convictions per 1,000 residents were 15.3 for foreign nationality and 6.1 for Spanish nationality. Spanish nationals were 70.2% of convicted adults. These are final sentences registered in 2025, including earlier offences.
Nationality is not birthplace or ancestry; naturalisation changes categories. These are unadjusted rates, not a causal effect. Danish indices are not multipliers for Spanish crime, and not all offences are violent.
Adults: final convictions by nationality, age and sex; offence year may be earlier
Spain · benefits and transitions into work
AIReF 2026 reports that 46% of households remain on IMV after 60 months, identifies employment disincentives not corrected by the current incentive, and proposes redesign.
Not a migrant or fraud statistic. These are households, not people; work and benefits can coexist. Persistence alone does not identify health, caring, job shortages or the effect of another reform.
Five-year benefit persistence, employment disincentives and redesign recommendations
Existing IMV earned-income compatibility; baseline is not an unconditional ban on work